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On Populist Illusion
Impasses of Political Ontology, or How the Ordinary
Matters
FACUNDO VEGA
The theoretical and political reasons that animate radical thought
today are products of a past glory based, to a great extent, on the fas-
cination with ‘the extraordinary’. Images of the break, of the act that
disturbs regularity, are what mostly draw the attention of those who
ascribe to a way of thinking politics that claims to be radical. At the
crossroads of our time, however, we find the absence of such images of
breaks and new political beginnings.
The generalization of this landscape within critical theory is con-
comitant with the replacement of faith in the great political act with
faith in the power of ontology. The post-Marxist variants that pointed
out the closed-mindedness of economism, determinism, and histor-
ical materialism in leftist tradition sought to overcome a new crisis
in Marxism by appealing to the notion of ‘the political’. This extra-
polation of ontological analysis onto the territory of politics has led
to a new exaltation of ‘the extraordinary’. The issue is no longer to
postulate a beginning as a great political act guided by historical ma-
terialist motifs, but, in a Heideggerian fashion, to establish ontological
foundation as the abyssal dimension of politics as such. Despite the
philosophico-political transformations that derive from this theoret-
ical novelty, what really animates it is the condemnation of what is
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conceived as ‘ordinary’. In sum, ‘the political’ seems to reinvigorate
radical thought after determinismhas exhausted the leftist tradition—
but at what cost?
This essay will consist of three sections in which I follow the
conviction that Ernesto Laclau’s discursivematerialism and later inter-
ventions on ‘populism’ offer important insights into these topics but
that they also catalyse blind spots on the ordinary matter of life in
common. First, I show how Laclau’s post-Marxist theory is based
on the idea that social division is the ground of politics and there-
fore is inscribed within an ontology-oriented (post‐)metaphysics. In
this context, it makes sense that Laclau operates a Heideggerian re-
articulation of the notion of ‘the political’. Second, I examine how this
philosophico-political move is exasperated by the Laclaudian under-
standing of populism. In particular, in the terms laid out by the later
Laclau, all radical politics requires the figure of the populist leader who
points towards the path of emancipation. However, while accepting
the productivity of ‘political difference’ — that is, the binary distinc-
tion between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’—under a populist inflection,
I argue that Laclau both restrains his previous ‘deepening of themateri-
alist project’1 and consecrates ‘political exceptionalism’. Facedwith the
assumption that the body of the populist leader as the epitome of ‘the
political’ primordially animates political beginnings, the last section of
this essay offers, as an alternative, the contours of an ordinary politics
of ‘the many’ as the territory par excellence of democratic foundations.
THE ‘DISCREET’ CHARM OF ‘THE POLITICAL’
A number of works in contemporary thought have vindicated the
contentious character of politics by pointing out the dangers of con-
1 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Political Significance of theConcept ofNegativity’,Vestnik, 1, (1988),
pp. 73–78 (p. 76). See also Ernesto Laclau, ‘La Politique comme construction de
l’impensable’, in Matérialités discursives, ed. by Bernard Conein, and others (Lille:
Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1981), pp. 65–74; ‘The Controversy over Materialism’,
in Rethinking Marx, ed. by Sakari Hänninen and Leena Paldán (Berlin: Argument,
1984), pp. 39–43; ‘Ideology and Post-Marxism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11.2
( June 2006), pp. 103–14 (p. 104); Ernesto Laclau andChantalMouffe, ‘Post-Marxism
without Apologies’, in Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time (London:
Verso, 1990), pp. 97–132 (pp. 105–12).
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sensualism.2 The focus on such notions as ‘conflict’ and ‘contin-
gency’ was aimed at shedding light on the mutability of political acts
while challenging the analytical stagnation of philosophies of progress
and deterministic economism. In other words, the impugnation of
a consensus-based theory and the concomitant vindication of social
division as the ground of politics sought to respond to the barren
summaries given by traditional perspectives that rested on invocations
of metaphysical foundations and political essentialism. Remarkably,
in the case of Laclau, his radical democratic critique of essentialism
staged a controversy over materialism. In fact, he claims that ‘the
only meaning of the term “materialism” which seems valid to me is
that which opposes the reduction of the real to the concept; this im-
plies that we must radically abandon the idea of a unifying essence of
society’.3 The tone of Laclau’s dispute engendered high expectations
for his radical democratic project and its extolment of ‘the political’.
By seeking to supersede all essentialism, that project migrated to the
territory of (post‐)metaphysics.
One of the most sophisticated attempts to explain how social div-
ision is at the basis of politics will illustrate the kind of problems I refer
to. In one of the prefaces to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe argue that they ‘conceive of the political not as
a superstructure but as having the status of an ontology of the social.
From this argument it follows that […] social division is inherent
[…] in the very possibility of a democratic politics’.4 There can be
no radical politics, Laclau and Mouffe add, without the identification
of an adversary. Their theory of politics is grounded on the assertion
that antagonism is the realization of the indeterminacy of the social.
Thus, they characterize radical democracy as a political form ‘which
is founded […] on affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of
2 See, among others, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2001); Alain Badiou,
Peut-on penser la politique? (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985); Jacques Rancière, La
Mésentente. Politique et Philosophie (Paris: ÉditionsGalilée, 1995); Étienne Balibar, La
Crainte des masses. Politique et Philosophie avant et après Marx (Paris: Éditions Galilée,
1997).
3 Laclau, ‘TheControversy overMaterialism’, p. 43; emphasis in the original. See the im-
portant addition to Laclau’s rendition of ‘materialism’ by FriederOttoWolf, ‘Summary
of Discussions’, in Rethinking Marx, ed. by Hänninen and Paldán, pp. 52–53.
4 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. xiv. Emphasis in the original.
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every “essence”, and on the constitutive character of social division and
antagonism’.5
This sui generis reinvigoration of the materialist repertoire trans-
formed certain presuppositions of the Marxist debate — the ‘onto-
logical’ supremacy of the working class, the conception of Revolution
as a foundingmoment, and the prospect of collective will as unitary, to
name a few. Such an undertaking demandednew theoretical postulates
— among others, the idea that, hegemonically, ‘the political’ is con-
stitutive of the social.The re-centring of ‘the political’ in Laclau’s work
is not amerely disruptive operation, but instead leads him to embrace a
singular intellectual perspective: post-structuralist thought.Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy, in fact, can be characterized as the epitome of the
post-structuralist political turn developed by Laclau in his later work,
which is crowned with twomovements: an attachment to the lack and
excess of ‘the ontological’ and its extrapolationonto thepolitical realm.
‘Lack’ and ‘excess’ as two necessary moments of a unique onto-
logical condition are essential to Laclau’s understanding of politics.
Laclau himself asserts that ‘lack and excess enter into the determin-
ation of social ontology’, operating with respect to a ‘failed unicity’ or
‘absent fullness’. Insofar as, for him, ‘every identity is a threatened iden-
tity’, then ‘antagonism is ontologically primary’.6 The onto-political
horizon described by Laclau is animated by the inevitable gap between
‘fullness of being’ and ‘actual being’. He views ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ as
the raison d’être of hegemony, that is, the moment when a particular
symbol or actor becomes representative of the universality of the com-
munity. Ultimately, ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ appear as originating principles
of the merger of ontological postulates and socio-political relations.
This ambitious combination, however, necessitates a supplement-
arymechanism. Laclau’s post-structuralism requires constitutive foun-
dations for the abyssal ground of politics, and because social relations
are in the last instance contingent, ‘the political’ plays that structur-
ing role. Vis-à-vis historical materialism, and understood as ‘radical
5 Ibid., 193. On antagonism vis-à-vis class struggle, see Ernesto Laclau, ‘Antagonism,
Subjectivity and Politics’, in his The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (London: Verso,
2014), pp. 101–25.
6 Ernesto Laclau, ‘The Future of Radical Democracy’, in Radical Democracy: Politics
between Abundance and Lack, ed. by Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 256–62 (p. 257).
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relationalism’, Laclau’s post-Marxist materialism proposes that ideas,
including those related to political grounding, ‘do not constitute a
closed and self-generated world, but are rooted in the ensemble of
material conditions of society’.7 His invocation of ‘the political’, then,
is the backbone of a situation traversed by the impossibility of total-
ization. The resolution of this stalemate has a precise significance in
Laclau’s project: ‘radical democracy is the first strictly political form
of social organisation, because it is the first one in which the pos-
ing and the withdrawal of the social ground is entirely dependent on
political interventions’.8 On the one hand, Laclau establishes the im-
possibility of an ultimate foundation of the social, and does so in a
post-structuralist fashion that seeks to avoid the limitations inherent
to the contraposition of classical idealism and materialism.9 On the
other, this operation is consolidated by appealing to ‘the political’ as
the moment of institution of the social.
Notably, Laclau’s onto-political operations rely on a return to
Martin Heidegger’s thought. In particular, Heidegger’s ‘ontological
difference’ appears profusely in Laclau’s work after Hegemony and So-
cialist Strategy to conform what was called ‘political difference’: while
‘politics’ refers to the concrete realm of decisionmaking, ‘the political’
would be the sphere from which politics originates. Laclau — some-
times defined as a ‘leftist Heideggerian’ — forges a post-foundational
theory that seeks to comprehend the ontological ‘un-grounding’ of
political principles.10 By vindicating the conflictual and contingent
character of politics under the aegis of anti-essentialism, Laclau claims
that ‘since, for essential reasons […] the fullness of society is un-
reachable, this split in the identity of political agents is an absolutely
constitutive “ontological difference” — in a sense not entirely unrelated
7 Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, p. 110.
8 Laclau, ‘The Future of Radical Democracy’, p. 261.
9 Neither related to the problem of the external existence of objects, nor to a contrapos-
ition of form and matter in which the latter is conceived as the ‘individual existent’,
Laclau is more interested in suggesting that ‘a world of fixed forms constituting the
ultimate reality of the object (idealism) is challenged by the relational, historical and
precarious character of the world of forms (materialism)’ (Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-
Marxism without Apologies’, p. 110; emphasis in the original).
10 See Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy,
Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
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to Heidegger’s use of this expression’.11 Laclau’s radical-democratic ap-
proach relies on stressing the difference between Sein and Seiende.
When ‘ontological difference’ is extrapolated onto the political realm
it becomes a necessary moment of Laclau’s ‘ontology of the social’.12
It is remarkable how Laclau’s invocation of democracy as a radical
order that resists the imprisonment of essentialist foundations repro-
duces ‘political difference’ over and over again. Laclau’s onto-political
instances are recurrent: ‘“Politics” is an ontological category: there is
politics because there is subversion and dislocation of the social.’13
Laclau’s analysis, to be sure, not only extrapolates ‘ontological differ-
ence’ onto ‘political difference’ but also, in particular, elevates one of
the structuring principles of the former, ‘the ontological’. Concerning
the allegation that his oeuvre focuses on the ontological dimension
of social theory and not on ontic research, Laclau replies that ‘this is
a charge to which I plead happily guilty, except that I do not see it
as a criticism at all. I have located my theoretical intervention at the
theoretical and philosophical level and it is at that level that it has to
be judged’.14 Laclau’s celebration of ontologism reaches a climax in
his later published works — to the extent that, in his own reckoning,
they show the ‘ontological centrality of the political’.15 His argument
is simply supernumerary insofar as ‘the ontological’ plays the role of a
ubiquitous Deus ex machina.
By pointing out these deficits in Laclau’s work, I do not mean
to minimize his influence over contemporary thought. Some of the
interest that Laclau’s intervention has aroused derives from his per-
ception that hegemonic politics moves from the struggle against the
11 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 60–61. Emphasis added.
12 See, among others, Ernesto Laclau and Lilian Zac, ‘Minding the Gap: The Subject of
Politics’, in The Making of Political Identities, ed. by Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso,
1994), pp. 11–39 (p. 30); Laclau, ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universal-
ity in the Constitution of Political Logics’, in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality:
Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, ed. by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj
Žižek (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 44–89 (pp. 58, 71, and 84–85); Laclau, ‘Glimpsing
the Future’, in Laclau: A Critical Reader, ed. by Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 279–328 (pp. 307–11 and 323); Laclau, ‘Antagon-
ism, Subjectivity and Politics’, pp. 112 and 115.
13 Ernesto Laclau, ‘New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time’, in New Reflections
on the Revolution of our Time, pp. 3–85 (p. 61).
14 Laclau, ‘Glimpsing the Future’, p. 321.
15 Laclau, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, p. 8.
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rigidities of historicalmaterialism toward the reference to fundamental
ontology. ‘Like the Heideggerian Abgrund’, Laclau claims, ‘the hege-
monic operation consists in a radical investment which, at the same
time as it attempts to establish a bridge between the ontic and the
ontological, reproduces their impossible convergence.’16 At this stage,
we should note that the invocation of ‘political difference’ conflates
two distinct strands in Laclau’s oeuvre: on the one hand, his emphasis
on the ‘dissolution of the myth of foundations’17 as a radicalization of
emancipatory thought attentive to a post-Marxist ‘materialism’, and,
on the other, the inscription of that abyssal nature of political founda-
tion on the altar of ontology. Laclau’s theory thus leads to a specific
impasse, in which a kind of post-structuralism conceived as post-
metaphysical is actually erected upon the essentialist coordinates of
fundamental ontology.
By examining Laclau’s attribution of an ontological character to
politics, I intend to note his ‘forgetfulness’ of the power and action of
‘the many’. That ‘forgetfulness’ is remarkable, especially since, accord-
ing to Laclau, his theorizations were in large measure derived from his
youthful activism. As Laclau explains:
when today I read Of Grammatology, S/Z, or the Écrits of
Lacan, the examples which always spring to mind are not from
philosophical or literary texts; they are from a discussion in
an Argentinian trade union, a clash of opposing slogans at a
demonstration, or a debate during a party congress. Through-
out his life Joyce returned to his native experience in Dublin;
for me it is those years of political struggle in Argentina of the
1960s that come to mind as a point of reference and compar-
ison.18
Rather than reading these recollections as manoeuvres concerning the
exoticism of a native land and of youthful political practice, I would
rather conceive of them as invectives with respect to a philosophico-
political plexus in crisis. Laclau himself notes that ‘the loss of collective
16 Laclau, ‘Antagonism, Subjectivity and Politics’, p. 121.
17 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Politics and the Limits of Modernity’, in Universal Abandon? The
Politics of Postmodernism, ed. by Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988), pp. 63–82 (p. 81).
18 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Theory, Democracy and Socialism’, in New Reflections on the Revolu-
tion of our Time, pp. 197–245 (p. 200).
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memory is not something to be overjoyed about. It is always an im-
poverishment and a traumatic fact. One only thinks from a tradition’.19
In the next section, I show that Laclau’s defence of the ontological
embodiment of the populist leader constitutes a renewed stage of his
Auseinandersetzung with the Marxist legacy — and that the tradition
that Laclau never abandoned is that of ‘political exceptionalism’, one
in which political beginnings are ontologically constituted and extra-
ordinary in nature.
THE LEADER’S NEW ONTOLOGICAL CLOTHES: POPULISM AND
THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION
In this section I examine how, in Laclau’s theory, the radical-
democratic ‘praise of the political’ takes a populist form. Laclau’s
considerations on populism are not restricted to his later work. In
fact, such reflections began during his political activism in Argentina
and coalesced with the publication of Politics and Ideology in Marxist
Theory in 1977. While there are exceptionalist constants in Laclau’s
work, his later encomium of ‘the political’ in a populist sense adds
a fundamental ingredient to his theoretical position: the supposed
radicalization offered by ‘ontological difference’ in its political
inflection.
According to this later Laclau, populism, understood as a ‘way of
constructing the political’20 that is clearly different from institutionalism
and its emphasis on gradualist administration, remains ‘an ontological
andnot anontic category’.21 ÉtienneBalibar has incisively summarized
the spectrum of Laclau’s theoretical attempt in the following terms:
‘populism, rethought and generalized according to a modality that
is no longer normative but ontological, is not a marginal, still less
a pathological, phenomenon. It is a presupposition of politics itself ’.
19 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Building a New Left’, inNew Reflections on the Revolution of our Time,
pp. 177–96 (p. 179; emphasis in the original).
20 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), p. xi; emphasis added.
21 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a Name?’, in Populism and the Mirror of Demo-
cracy, ed. by Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 32–49 (p. 34).
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Hence, Balibar concludes, ‘its denial […] appears as itself the effect of
society’s blindness to its own bases’.22
For Laclau, undoing this blindness with respect to the constitu-
tion of the social involves moving toward a definition of populism as
a ‘political logic’ and a ‘performative act endowed with a rationality
of its own’.23 On the one hand, Laclau asserts that the ‘dismissal [of
populism] has been part of the discursive construction of a certain
normality’;24 while, on the other hand, Laclau argues that confront-
ing this situation endows the difference between ‘the ontic’ and ‘the
ontological’ with a political significance, giving primacy to the second
term.25 In a world in which politics is conceived as mere adminis-
tration, it is imperative to solve the theoretical impasse around ‘the
political’ in a populist vein. The condition for this solution that is not
asserted categorically, however, is that populism must be understood
with reference to the command of the leader. According to Laclau,
administrative politics, which is opposed to populism, embodies the
myth of the ‘totally reconciled society—which invariably presupposes
the absence of leadership, that is, the withering away of the political’.26
Inversely, for Laclau leadership is constitutive of ‘the political’ and
expresses the nature of ‘political difference’ in the highest sense.
Both undertheorized and omnipresent, the populist leader offsets
the dispersion of ‘the people’.The notion of ‘social demand’ is essential
in this regard, for, according to Laclau, it remains the smallest unit
to analyse the constitution of ‘the people’. Although ‘demand’ may
equally refer to ‘request’ as it may to ‘claim’,27 it should not be neces-
sarily restricted to the domain of the antagonismof ‘the people’ against
the power bloc. Rather, Laclau himself stresses that ‘the people’ neces-
sitates a specific ‘other’ to catalyse its demands: the leader. Without
the leader’s acts, in fact, ‘democratic demands’, which are of an isolated
22 Étienne Balibar, La Proposition de l’Égaliberté (Paris: PUF, 2010), p. 232; Equaliberty:
Political Essays, trans. by James Ingram (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013),
pp. 189–90.
23 Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 117 and 18.
24 Ibid., p. 19.
25 See ibid., pp. 4, 67–68, 71–72, 87–88, 94, 103, 111, 114–16, 127, 132, 160–61, 163,
222, 224–26, 229, and 245–46.
26 Ibid., p. 63; emphasis in the original and added.
27 Ibid., 73.
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nature, could never become ‘popular demands’, which help ‘to consti-
tute the “people” as a potential historical actor’.28
Laclau is cautious regarding the idea that the love of the leader
might be the only libidinal tie of a group. Nonetheless, he also argues
that the elimination of ‘the need for a leader corresponds, almost point
by point, to a society entirely governed by what I have called the logic
of difference’. He then adds that ‘such a society is an impossibility’.29
The emergence of ‘the people’, according to Laclau, entails the inter-
vention of something ‘qualitatively new’. In this vein, he asserts that
the constitution of popular identity, as a symbol, does not express in
a passive way but actually constitutes what it expresses. Laclau’s dis-
cursivematerialism conveys, in his ownwords, ‘the attempt of showing
how the being of objects, far from being fixed and simply “given” to the
contemplation of human beings, is socially constructed through their
actions.’30 And yet, the process that he describes cannot establish ‘the
many’ as protagonists of democratic politics.
The obliteration of the role of ‘the many’ in populist politics is
even clearerwhenLaclau decrees that ‘an assemblage of heterogeneous
elements kept equivalentially together only by a name is […]necessar-
ily a singularity’. Asserting that individuality is the most extreme form
of singularity, Laclau arrives at a corollary that reveals the ‘truth of
populism’: ‘In this way, almost imperceptibly, the equivalential logic
leads to singularity, and singularity to identification of the unity of
the group with the name of the leader.’31 In sum, although Laclau’s
analysis is sparse on this point, we can infer that the figure of the leader
animates the populist phenomenon — which is remarkable, since,
for him, ‘populist reason […] amounts […] to political reason tout
court’.32 Populism, then, stages the subjection of ‘the people’ to the
dictates of popular ‘authority’, forging a unity based on the power of
the ‘great man’ which vanishes once this figure passes away.
The invocation of the extra-quotidian character of the leader
within Laclau’s construct deserves further scrutiny. It is possible to
28 Ibid., pp. 74 and 120.
29 Ibid., p. 82.
30 Laclau, ‘Political Significance of the Concept of Negativity’, p. 76.
31 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 100.
32 Ibid., p. 225; emphasis in the original.
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address this issue by observing that, aside from the notions of ‘de-
mands’ and ‘the name of the leader’, the concept of ‘representation’
is central to Laclau’s understanding of populism.33 Laclau’s discussion
of representation is primarily aimed at comprehending the leader as a
symbol maker. His or her activity, Laclau argues, ‘no longer conceived
as “acting for” his constituents, becomes identified with effective lead-
ership’.34 Laclau emphasizes that ‘identity’ does not precede the ‘pro-
cess of representation’ but rather results from it. Mutatis mutandis,
representation is the premise for the constitution of a ‘popular will’.
In Laclau’s terms, the construction of a ‘people’ cannot but take place
through representation.
Critics have pointed out the fallacy in the assumption that the rep-
resentative articulation of demands necessarily leads to the emergence
of a cohesive political entity. As Slavoj Žižek suggests, ‘there is nothing
in the heterogeneity of demands that predisposes them to be unified
in people’.35 Certainly, Laclau understands representation as having a
performative character. Populism, in this sense, becomes a discourse
that brings into being what it claims to represent, namely ‘the people’.
But even consideringpopulismwithin thedomainof political perform-
ativity is not a sufficient basis to conclude, as Laclau does, that every
will is constituted as such after representation. And if representation is
by and large equivalent with the expression of the leader’s will, then it
is restricted to playing the role of a unifying force.
Be that as it may, Laclau’s defence of the role of the populist leader
is even more questionable given the author’s familiarity with Ernst
Kantorowicz’s theory of the King’s two bodies.36 Though I cannot
scrutinize the implications of this debate around political legitimacy
and corporality here, I would like to return to Laclau’s last dictum:
‘the logic of the King’s two bodies has not disappeared in democratic
society: it is simply not true that pure emptiness has replaced the
33 On ‘representation’ in his work, see, among others, Laclau, ‘Power andRepresentation’,
in Emancipation(s), pp. 84–104; On Populist Reason, pp. 157–71.
34 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 160.
35 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Against the Populist Temptation’, Critical Inquiry, 32.3 (Spring 2006),
pp. 551–74 (p. 564); emphasis in the original.
36 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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immortal body of the King. This immortal body is revived by the
hegemonic force’. Laclau adds:
What has changed in democracy, as compared with the anciens
régimes [sic], is that in the latter that revival took place in only
onebody,while today it transmigrates through a variety of bod-
ies. But the logic of embodiment continues to operate under
democratic conditions and, under certain circumstances, it can
acquire considerable stability.37
It is surprising that Laclau, an author who is so prone to conceptual
constructs, does not specify the nature of the democratic ‘variety of
bodies’ to which he refers. Whisking this specification away, Laclau
neglects a radical materialist consideration of ‘the many’ — an over-
sight that leads him to focus on the corporality of leaders. His thesis
is that hegemonic force rekindles a sort of immortal ‘energy’. Even if
we accept this proposition, it seems difficult to see where the limits
of that ‘extraordinariness’ might be — especially when Laclau himself
assumes that democratic incarnations are always contingent and that
there is no ultimate guarantee or transcendental source of legitimation
that might structure life in common.
BETWEEN THE ORDINARY AND THE EXTRAORDINARY: THE
COMBINED POWER OF ‘THE MANY’
Beyond the equivalence between populism and politics and its hypo-
stasis in the body of the leader, I want to argue that life in common
does not have impregnable origins waiting to be disinterred. Political
beginnings are nothing but a complex of intertwined ordinary and
non-ordinarymoments which evade all confinement in the binary edi-
fice erected between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. The extolment of ‘the
political’, and particularly the proverbial instantiation of exceptional-
ism in radical thought, cannot account exhaustively for the emergence
of beginnings enacted by the politics of ‘the many’.38
37 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 170.
38 To avoid the idealization and aestheticization of ‘lack’, the phrase ‘the ordinary’ is used
in this essay to refer to a realm of action and not to ‘the many’ themselves. At the same
time, ‘the many’ indicate that democracy is evasive vis-à-vis the sanctification of the
will of ‘the people’. To put it differently, the appeal to ‘the many’ acknowledges the
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In Laclau’s later works, this neglect is embodied in his enthroning
of the populist leader and is also apparently compensated for by the
author’s interest in the constitution of a political ontology. While in
his early work Laclau focused on themultiplicity of struggles inscribed
in the democratic revolution and then confronted the narrative of the
great emancipatory act with a variety of emancipatory movements,
in his later work he moved away from pluralized radical politics. In
fact, for Laclau, the construction of a popular subjectivity ‘reaches
a point where the homogenising function is carried out by a pure
name: the name of the leader’.39 What remains to be understood here
is why populist hegemony is the form of expression par excellence of
an antagonistic excess with respect to the democratic institutions that
normally regulate political conflict or why, as Laclau claims, ‘radical
democracy is always “populist”.’40
Laclau’s populism implies de-substantializing ‘the people’ and
then, in a (post‐)metaphysical and discursive vein, re-substantializing
this collective through the figure of the leader. In such theoretical ges-
tures, we can still detect Laclau’s Auseinandersetzung with materialism
through his invocations of the ‘materiality of the signifier’ or the ‘ma-
teriality of language’.41 However, Laclau’s ‘rhetoricalmaterialismof the
subject’ might resemble ‘a voluntarism of sorts’.42 More importantly,
his operationof de-substantializing and re-substantializing ‘thepeople’
leads to a disdain for the autonomy of ‘the many’. It is true that the
view of ‘the people’ as irrational plebs has persisted even after the con-
solidation of modern and contemporary revolutions. Going against
this tendency, Laclau’s populist project invokes radical democracy to
centrality of political subjectivity without somehow acceding to the idea of ‘a good
people’.
39 Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a Name?’, p. 40; emphasis added.
40 Laclau, ‘The Future of Radical Democracy’, p. 259; emphasis added.
41 See, among others, Laclau, ‘Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?’, in Emanci-
pation(s), pp. 36–46; The Rhetorical Foundations of Society.
42 John Kraniauskas, ‘Rhetorics of populism’, Radical Philosophy: A Journal of Socialist
and Feminist Philosophy, 186 ( July/August 2014), pp. 29–37 (p. 33). On the relation
between discourse andmaterialism in Laclau, see, among others, RosemaryHennessy,
Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.
59–64; Benjamin Glasson, ‘Unspeakable Articulations: Steps Towards a Materialist
Discourse Theory’, in Material Discourse-Materialist Analysis: Approaches in Discourse
Studies, ed. by Johannes Beetz and Veit Schwab (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2017), pp. 81–94.
340 ON POPULIST ILLUSION
revalue the politically marginalized: And yet, rather than considering
the underdog as autonomous, he suggests that it is the extra-quotidian
nature of the body of the leader which brings the marginalized into
actual political existence.
It may be that these elaborations are aimed at extricating ‘the
people’ of populism from the danger of ‘homogeneity’. But after the
foregoing analysis, we may discern an additional motif of the ‘political
exceptionalism’ that consecrates the disdain for the autonomy of ‘the
many’ in the work of Laclau and other theorists of populism. ‘The
people’, or rather their ‘people’, is not only subordinated to the figure
of the leader; it is also an intellectual construct. ‘A first theoretical
decision’, Laclau declares, ‘is to conceive of the “people” as a polit-
ical category, not as a datum of the social structure.’43 In this way,
‘the people’ is not just born from the political will of the populist
leader. More fundamentally, this collective originates from the analyt-
ical design of the populist intellectual who places his or her principles
beyond the immediate historical context and ‘mere’ empirical reality.
Vis-à-vis this triple imprisonment — by the figure of ‘the people’, the
decisions of the populist leader, and the judgments of the populist in-
tellectual— ‘themany’ must return to the central scene of democratic
politics.
Thus far, we have seen how Laclau, by adopting ‘political differ-
ence’, endowed the body of the populist leader with an ontological
status. But he also goes further than that. His use of ontological jargon
to define politics is notmerely descriptive but symbolizes his intention
to lay out a ‘political ontology’ and to elaborate a general theory of
‘the political’. Laclau’s endeavour to address ‘the political’ is charac-
terized by a polarity: Marx (deconstructed) with Heidegger. Within
that dichotomy, Laclau seems to privilegeHeidegger, which affects his
radical materialist project.44 In his last published work, he asserts that
his aim is ‘the construction of a political ontology which can respond
43 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 224; emphasis in the original.
44 By embracing Heideggerian ‘ontological difference’, Laclau avoids a thematization of
Heidegger’s derogatory rendition of materialism. See, among others, Martin Heideg-
ger, Gesamtausgabe, 102 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1975–) viii, pp. 27, 160,
and 208; ix, pp. 268, 340, and 365; x, pp. 131 and 179–80; xv, pp. 352–53 and 387–89,
xvi, p. 703; xxxvi/xxxvii, p. 211; xl, p. 50; l, p. 154; lxv, pp. 54 and 148; lxxviii,
pp. 12–14 and 190; lxxix, pp. 88 and 94–95; lxxxiii, pp. 179, 209, and 508; lxxxix,
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to the challenges presented by the post-Marxist and post-structuralist
situation within which we are operating’.45 For Laclau, returning to
the Marxist legacy requires appreciating its inherent plurality. But the
trajectory he delineates, from the vindication of ‘post-Marxism’ —
understood by Laclau himself as the reformulation of ‘the materialist
programme in a much more radical way than was possible for Marx’46
—to his final encomium of populism, proves to be an attempt to think
beyond the ‘relationalist’ universe.
Having left class struggle far behind, the plot of Laclau’s political
drama is neither based on the plural struggles of social movements
nor on so-called materialist ‘democratic radicalization’. Instead, rad-
ical thought is enacted on the stage of a ruptured metaphysics. The
establishment of a ground as abyss, together with the understanding
of representation as a process of de-grounding, are made legitimate
through Laclau’s recourse to the notion of ‘post-foundationalism’. But
due to the abyssal conditions being constitutive, this lack requires an
excess. Previously, we have examined how, in Laclau’s later works, pop-
ulist leadership necessitates a supernumerary recourse to ontology.
We are now ready to assess a crucial addendum: the essential contin-
gency of political foundation requires a particular stabilization that, for
Laclau, must come from the political ontology that he has forged — a
political ontology that claims to univocally identify ‘the political (in the
ontological sense of the term, which has little to do with political or-
ganizations and structures)’47 and might re-stage a faith in a totalizing
moment with idealist effects.48
The transition from Marx (deconstructed) to Heidegger is not
restricted to Laclau’s work. This is why the present examination of
his theoretical edifice has a broader scope. As we problematize the
pp. 461–62 and 527; xciv, pp. 143, 424, and 428; xcv, pp. 40, 129, 149, and 360; xcvi,
p. 150; xcvii, pp. 28 and 127; xcviii, pp. 382 and 398–99.
45 Laclau, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, p. 1; emphasis added.
46 Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, p. 112.
47 Laclau, ‘Antagonism, Subjectivity and Politics’, p. 123; emphasis in the original.
48 This result is at odds with Laclau’s previous insistence on moving away from idealist
instances, which would consist ‘in showing the historical, contingent and constructed
character of the being of objects; and in showing that this depends on the reinsertion of
that being in the ensemble of relational conditions which constitute the life of a society
as a whole’ (Laclau and Mouffe, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, p. 111; emphasis
in the original).
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fascination with ‘the extraordinary’ inherent in ‘political difference’,
the point is to set out the bases for a renewed reflection on the ordinary
irruption of ‘the many’ in democratic politics.49 As a propaedeutic
for this task, in the preceding pages I have established how Laclau’s
‘populist illusion’ — not meant in terms of a deception but instead as
a high aspiration and unreachable dream— is an outstanding example
of ‘political exceptionalism’. The bases for that exceptionalism are the
conception of division and contingency as the ground of politics, the
equation of political reason with populist reason, the figuration of the
leader as the guarantor of populism vis-à-vis the postulated ‘people’
as a counterpart with demands, and the invocation of a Heideggerian
‘ontological difference’ for the elaboration of a political ontology.
When we challenge exceptionalism and understand the distinction
between the politically normal and exceptional as a matter that is up
for debate, we can hardly take the onto-political stabilization offered
by Laclau for granted. Beyond this operation, the leader seems to
lose his/her ‘extraordinariness’ and his/her body becomes the very
manifestation of human frailty. In turn, ‘the many’ — those who are
presumably subjected to authority — no longer merely express de-
mands and gain an ‘ordinariness’ to shape common beginnings. All
in all, this non-exceptionalist reconfiguration shows that the tasks of
the materialist programme that Laclau initiated and, unfortunately,
interrupted, can and should move forward.
Throughout this essay, it has become clear that Laclau’s narration
of populism contains an ambivalent gesture. On the one hand, he re-
pudiates all determinism, and especially the dogma of normality in
both the liberal and Marxist traditions. On the other hand, he praises
the forces of ‘the extraordinary’ and forges an ontological essential-
ism which, reversing his previous ‘radical materialism’, reinvigorates
the idea of having control of the totality of reality and its historical
49 That irruption does not necessarily amount to political empowerment. Although the
jargonof ‘the ordinary’, and ‘themany’ can hardly bemobilized to promote the order of
rank, the praise of ‘the commonman’ has not always constituted a call to emancipation.
From the Fronte dell’UomoQualunque in Italy to recent populistmovements, including
the notion that ‘everyone’ is an entrepreneur of his/her/their own life, the ‘common
man’ may well be the subject invoked by regressive political currents. See, among
others, Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 3.
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development. A critical analysis of Laclau’s account yields a valuable
lesson for contemporary approaches to grounding politics in away that
is animated by ‘the extraordinary’.
Let us now return to the question posed at the beginning of this
essay regarding which principle can govern radical democratic politics
when its old foundations seem to have vanished. Our examination of
Laclau’s exceptionalism has offered clues that allow us to avoid the
impasse that ensues whenwe totalize ‘the political’. Oneway to eschew
this philosophico-political dilemma is to accept that ‘the ordinary’ is
not the negation but the matter of the politically extraordinary. In
this light, we may understand not only that ‘“emancipation” is a per-
formance to which we always arrive late and which forces us to guess,
painfully, about its mythical or impossible origins’,50 but, especially,
that the unfolding of a new beginning also depends on the combined
power of ‘the many’.
50 Laclau, Emancipation(s), 82.
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